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ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to help mainstream programmers routinely
use formal verification on their smart contracts by 1) proposing a
new YAML-format for writing general-purpose formal specifica-
tions, 2) demonstrating how a formal specification can be incremen-
tally built up without needing advanced training, and 3) showing
how formal specifications can be tested by using program mutation.
1 INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to help mainstream programmers routinely
use formal verification on their smart contracts. It attempts to
achieve this by:
(1) proposing a simple, general-purpose, easy-to-read YAML for-
mat for writing formal specifications that is purely syntactic
sugar for the K Framework [22] and can thus, in principle,
be used for any smart contract language (Section 4),
(2) demonstrating how a programmer can incrementally build
up a formal specification for their programwithout advanced
training and without needing to understand the internals of
the formal verification prover (Sections 5),
(3) showing how formal specifications can be tested by con-
structing mutant variations of the program. (Section 7).
Section 2 gives an overview of the K Framework. Section 3 dis-
cusses the major usability challenges that state-of-the-art formal
verification systems share that have inhibited their mainstream
adoption. Section 6 describes the partial formal specification written
for the SimpleMultiSig, a real Ethereum multisig smart contract.
2 K FRAMEWORK
The K Framework [22] is a disruptive system in programming
languages that seeks to enable the design and implementation of
programming tools (such as compilers, virtual machines, deductive
verifiers, and others) independently of a particular programming
language. Its vision is that, once the syntax and operational seman-
tics of a programming language is specified in K, the K Framework
can automatically generate programming tools in a correct-by-
construction manner:
K semantics have been successfully written and tested for sev-
eral popular and widely-used languages including C [11], Java [3],
EVM [12], Javascript [19], x86-64 [5], and others. The K Framework
itself and these individual language semantics are open-sourced
under the UIUC License, which is permissive and free. One of the
distinctive advantages of a K semantics for a programming lan-
guage is that it is executable in the sense that the K Framework
can immediately generate an interpreter for the language directly
from the K semantics. This interpreter can be used to execute any
program written in that language which enables one to actually
write and run test cases on the semantics. In contrast, for exam-
ple, the EVM Yellow Paper [25] is an English language semantics
that is not executable and has been found to be unclear, under-
specified, and, in exceptional cases, inconsistent with actual EVM
implementations [12]. The Ethereum Foundation has been consid-
ering adopting the K-EVM semantics as the official semantics for
the EVM.
Even at this early stage of the area, many new programming
languages have already been proposed, developed or adopted to sup-
port decentralization. Some examples are Move, Mokoto, Solidity,
Vyper, Serpent, and WebAssembly. It is impractical and wasteful to
repeatedly build a new formal verification system for each language.
Furthermore, programming languages are constantly evolving and
continually needing to keep a formal verification system up-to-date
with the latest versions is expensive. The power of the K Framework
is that formal verification systems can be developed independently
of a particular programming language. Once the semantics of the
language is formally defined in K, a K-based prover can immediately
be used to formally verify properties of programs written in that
language.
3 USABILITY
This section discusses some of the usability issues that state-of-the-
art formal verification system typically have.
3.1 User Interactions
A user typically interacts with a formal verification system in sev-
eral different ways:
• The user writes a formal specification of the program in
a declarative, logic-based specification language that the
prover must be designed to handle.
• The userwrites formal summaries that are attached to difficult-
to-reason-about blocks of the program, such as a particular
function or loop. A formal summary is typically written in
the same logic language as the actual formal specification
and either partially or fully encodes the block’s behavior or
gives the prover hints about how to reason about the block.
• The user reads the final output of the prover which ideally
is a formal proof that can be mechanically checked by a
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proof checker that is orders of magnitude simpler and smaller
than the prover itself. Unfortunately, most systems simply
output either "yes, the program adheres to the spec" or "no,
the program does not adhere to the spec", which introduces
trust issues discussed in Section 3.5.
• The user reads the auxiliary output of the prover that may
give the user some information about why the prover is not
able to prove the spec within a reasonable time period. This
auxiliary output typically requires deep understanding of
the internals of the prover’s implementation as well as its
underlying mathematical foundations.
3.2 Undecidability
The undecidability of the halting problem [23] has a direct impact
on the usability of formal verification systems. Rice’s theorem [20],
an immediate consequence of the halting problem, states that all
non-trivial, semantic properties of programs are undecidable. Thus,
it is impossible for a prover to be fully automatic across all programs,
for any interesting semantic property. This limitation implies that
a user will inevitably need to interact with the prover, in some
manner beyond simply writing the formal specification, because
the prover cannot, in general, be fully automatic and will need the
user’s help to push the proof through.
For example, provers requires that the user supplies a formal
invariant for each dynamically-bound loop in a program, and these
invariants are difficult for non-experts to write. For example, see
the encodepacked_keccak00 (§ 5.6) and encodepacked_keccak01
(§ 5.6) programs, the ecrecoverloop01 (§ 5.9) program, and the
storage02 (§ 5.12) program.
3.3 Language Level and Compilation Stage
A practical formal verification system will make many design deci-
sion in its implementation, but one of the most impactful is choos-
ing the programming language and compilation stage the prover
will operate at. Systems will typically take one of the following
approaches:
3.3.1 Higher Language Level / Early Compilation Stage. With this
approach, the prover is designed to work directly on the program
in its original form, in the source language in which it was written,
before any compilation step and without any significant source
code transformations. This approach has several disadvantages:
(1) High-level languages such as Solidity or C++ are enormous,
and it would require immense engineering resources to
model every language construct. For example, the Solid-
ity language includes inline assembly which means that a
prover that operates at the Solidity level would need to be
engineered to reason about every inline assembly instruction
as well the rest of the high level Solidity language.
(2) The prover would only work for the chosen high-level pro-
gramming language and would need to be actively main-
tained and updated for every new version of the language,
which is costly especially for a language like Solidity which
is constantly being iterated on [7].
(3) The prover’s conclusion about the correctness of the program
would only apply to the high-level program and not the
final binary produced by compiler which is what actually
gets executed. The compiler could have a bug, for example
in its optimization passes, which incorrectly changes the
semantics of the program in its binary form.
On the other hand, a very compelling advantage of this approach,
which perhaps compensates for the disadvantages listed above, is
that because the prover works at the language level at which the
program was written, it makes it easier for the user to interact
with the prover, make sense of its behavior, and understand its
auxiliary output (Section 3.1). As explained in Section 3.2, the user
will inevitably need to interact closely with a prover because of the
theoretical limits of fully automated formal verification.
3.3.2 Lower Language Level / Late Compilation Stage. With this
approach, the prover is designed to work after the last compila-
tion stage, directly on the binary produced by the compiler, for
example on optimized EVM bytecode or x86 instructions. This ap-
proach as several major advantages which somewhat mirror the
disadvantages of operating at a higher-level:
(1) Lower level languages such as EVM bytecode and x86 will
reduce the richness of higher level language constructs to a
set of basic word-level operations. For example, in Solidity,
the mapping data structure is compiled down to simple key-
value pairs in an account’s storage. This reduction drastically
simplifies the engineering of the prover.
(2) The prover’s conclusion about the correctness of the program
applies to the program in its executable form, which means
the user does not need to trust the compiler.
(3) The prover can be applied to programs originally written
in any high-level language that compiles down to the same
bytecode or binary language. For example, a prover that
works on EVM bytecode could be used for programs orig-
inally written in both Solidity and Vyper by compiling it
down to EVM bytecode first.
However, a critical disadvantage of this approach is that the user
experience of interactingwith a prover that operates at the bytecode
level is prohibitively tedious and time-consuming. Some examples
of this phenomenon are discussed in Section 5 in the context of
proving properties of the SimpleMultiSig smart contract at the
EVM bytecode level.
3.3.3 Intermediate Language Level / Mid Compilation Stage. A com-
mon approach is to design the prover to operate on the intermediate
language of a standard compiler infrastructure, such LLVM [15] or
yul [8]. An intermediate language reduces the higher level language
to a more manageable set of operations and data structures, but
also retains some of the important high-level constructs that make
formal verification easier such as structured control flow, functions
and some type information. This approach is a compromise between
strictly operating the prover at either a higher-level or lower-level
language, which mitigates the impact of both their advantages and
disadvantages. For example:
• LLVM bitcode is much more readable than x86 assembly but
still much less readable that C++. Readability is important
because it enables the user to interact with the prover more
effectively.
• Many higher-level languages compile down to LLVM bitcode
which enables the prover to work on programs originally
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written in any of those languages, but now the user has to
trust the portion of the compiler infrastructure that generates
machine code from LLVM bitcode because the prover only
operates on the LLVM bitcode.
One notable instance of this approach is to create a new, spe-
cialized intermediate programming language specifically designed
for formal verification instead of machine-code generation. For
example, the solc-verify [10] and Verisol verification tools [14]
translate Solidity programs to Boogie [1], a verification interme-
diate language. Similar, in [2], Solidity programs are translated to
F*.
3.4 Formalization of Correctness Properties
The first step to formally verifying a program is informally, yet
rigorously, describing what the intended correct behavior of the
program is, and then translating this informal description into a
formal specification that a mechanized prover can understand. This
translation step is critical because the proof generated by the prover
assumes that the formal specification is correct in the sense that
it faithfully captures the intended correctness properties of the
program.
3.4.1 Formal specifications need be simple for humans to read and
understand. The premise of formal verification is that formal speci-
fications are much simpler to understand and be convinced of being
correct than the program. It is unclear how useful formal verifica-
tion is when the formal specification is longer or more difficult to
read than the program itself.
3.4.2 A partial versus a full formal specification. Users typically do
not write formal specifications for all correctness properties of a
program because writing and proving formal specifications is time-
consuming and difficult. Instead, in practice, users consider the cost
and benefit of formally specifying a property. See Section 5.4 for
an example of making this practical trade-off.
3.5 Provers are not trustworthy
A prover often consists of hundreds of thousands of lines of highly
complex code and thus bugs in the prover are inevitable which
could cause the prover to incorrectly claim that a program follows
specification when it does not. A technique called proof carrying
code [18] has been extensively researched in academia that aims to
address this challenge, but has not been used in practice.
3.6 Investigating Why the Prover Fails
The prover may fail to prove a specification for several reasons:
(1) The specification has a bug.
(2) The program has a bug.
(3) The prover has a bug.
(4) The language semantics has a bug.
(5) The underlying constraint solver (e.g Z3 [6]) has a bug.
(6) An incorrect lemma was supplied.
(7) The prover is not powerful enough to reason automatically
about the program and specification.
Trying to figure why the prover fails is tedious, difficult and
time-consuming because typically a user would need to understand
the internals of the prover implementation as well as its method
of deductive reasoning. Conceptually, a prover works by carefully
exploring the entire, exponentially-sized state space of the program
under all possible inputs. Some tools such as KLab [4] have been
developed to help users navigate this state space, similar to how
a debugger can be used to step through the state changes of a
program under a single input.
3.7 EVM Bytecode
Some of the design of EVM bytecode makes formal verification
tedious, difficult, and time-consuming. For example, the EVM does
not have functions, which means that a user will need to specify the
actual program counter of the EVM bytecode that the specification
applies to. If the user changes the Solidity program and recompiles
it to EVM bytecode, the user will need to manually update the
program counter in the specification. This manual process is error-
prone because if the user gets it wrong, the specification will be
incorrect and thus a buggy program may pass through undetected.
4 K-YAML
The K specification language is based on matching logic [21] which
makes it powerful, expressive, and flexible, but its syntax can be
difficult for new users to read. K’s syntax was originally designed
to make it easier for formal methods experts to specify complete
executable semantics for entire programming languages, and thus,
one of its design priorities was optimizing the succinctness of writ-
ing individual rules. However, for programmers without experience
in formal methods who only want to use K to write correctness
specifications for their programs, the syntax can initially seem
prohibitively esoteric.
This paper proposes a simple YAML-based format for structuring
K specifications called K-YAML that enables users to write easier-
to-read specifications for formally verifying programs. YAML was
chosen because it is a widely-used, human-readable, system con-
figuration file format that programmers are comfortable with. The
key design decision of K-YAML is to be purely syntactic sugar for K
and to not abstract away any part of it in order to retain its power
and expressivity.
A K-YAML specification is a list of spec blocks where each block
has the following structure:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: <Name-of-Spec >
4 inherits: <Name-of-Parent-Spec >
5 if:
6 match:
7 <If-Terms >
8 where:
9 <If-Constraints >
10 then:
11 match:
12 <Then-Terms >
13 where:
14 <Then-Constraints >
• The name key designates a name for this spec block that can
be referenced elsewhere in the specification.
• The inherits key references another spec block to indicate
that this one inherits from it. (Section 5.5)
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• The if key is the precondition, which defines the set of ini-
tial program states of interest using two components: match
and where. Conceptually, the match component is similar to
Rust’s match operator which accepts patterns over terms and
variables to describe the structure of data and then matches
and binds a value against the structure. Here, match is a
dictionary whose keys are K configuration cells and whose
values are K terms over symbolic variables. The where com-
ponent is a list of conjuncts over K predicates and symbolic
variables that have possibly been bound by the match com-
ponent. A program state is in the precondition if it matches
the match dictionary and satisfies the where constraints.
• The then key is the postcondition which specifies what the
final program states should be in terms of the initial program
states defined by the precondition. It uses the same match
and where mechanism to specify this set of final program
states.
Section 5 gives many examples of small programs and the corre-
sponding correctness specifications in K-YAML.
5 VERIFICATIONWALKTHROUGH
This section details some of my experience using the K prover to
verify a few properties of the SimpleMultiSig smart contract. I was
not involved in the K prover’s design and implementation, and thus,
I needed to find a way to use it effectively without understanding
its internals. My approach was to start by formally verifying simple
programs and then incrementally adding new functionality until I
reconstructed the SimpleMultiSig. This approach enabled me to
use the prover as a black box as much as possible, thus minimizing
the need to understand its internals. However, I did need to have
a thorough understanding of the K-EVM semantics [12] to make
progress.
5.1 Starting Point
As a starting point, I used the simple program below which has a
single function named execute that returns the value 5:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract simple00 {
3 function execute () public returns (uint) {
4 return 5;
5 }
6 }
Then I wrote the specification below to try to prove that each
transaction to the execute function always returns the value 5
successfully. More technically stated, the specification ensures
that when the calldata of a transaction matches the ABI-encoding
of executeâĂŹs function-selector, the value returned is the ABI-
encoding of the constant 5 as a 32-byte uint256, and the status
code of the transaction is EVMC_SUCCESS:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 callData: \#abiCallData("execute", .
TypedArgs)
6 then:
7 match:
8 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
9 output: \#encodeArgs(#uint256 (5))
Then I compiled the program to EVM bytecode using the So-
lidity compiler and invoked the K prover on the bytecode and the
specification. After a few seconds, the prover returned True, which
indicates that it was able to formally prove that the program passes
the specification for all possible transactions, in the context of all
possible blockchain states.
5.2 Using function parameters
Next, I took the previous program and modified it by 1) adding a
parameter a0 to the execute function and 2) returning a0 instead
of the constant 5.
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract simple02 {
3 function execute(uint a0) public returns (uint) {
4 return a0;
5 }
6 }
The specification had to be modified as follows:
(1) The callData cell was changed by introducing a fresh sym-
bolic variable A0 that is bound to the first, 32-byte argument
of the calldata.
(2) The output cell was changed to return A0, thus specifying
that execute returns the value of its first, 32-byte argument.
(3) Finally, a where constraint is added to constrain the value of
the symbolic variable A0 to be within the uint256 domain,
which includes all integers between 0 ≤ A0 < 2256.
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 callData: \#abiCallData("execute",\#uint256
(A0))
6 where:
7 - \#rangeUInt (256, A0)
8 then:
9 match:
10 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
11 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(A0))
5.3 Static Arrays
Next, I changed the program to accept a static array parameter and
return its first element.
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract staticarray00 {
3 function execute(uint [3] memory a)
4 public returns (uint) {
5 return a[0];
6 }
7 }
Because the KEVM semantics did not have an existing a high-
level construct for expressing static array calldata parameters, I
needed to add it myself. Fortunately, the ABI encoding of statically-
sized data structures is simple: they are straightforwardly flattened
into a tuple of 32-byte elements. I defined a new K rule named
#abiCallData2 that behaves exactly like the existing #abiCallData
function except that it enables the user to specify the full function
signature instead of only the function name:
1 syntax WordStack ::=
2 #abiCallData2 ( String , TypedArgs ) [function]
3
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4 rule #abiCallData2( FSIG , ARGS )
5 => #parseByteStack(substrString(Keccak256(FSIG), 0,
8))
6 ++ #encodeArgs(ARGS)
This new #abiCallData2 function enabled me to represent the
static array parameter a as the tuple (A0, A1, A2) where A0, A1,
A2 are 32-byte, fresh symbolic variables:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(
uint256[3])",
6 \#uint256(A0), \#uint256(A1), \#uint256(
A2))
7 where:
8 - \#rangeUInt (256, A0)
9 - \#rangeUInt (256, A1)
10 - \#rangeUInt (256, A2)
11 then:
12 match:
13 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
14 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(A0))
This is a good example of the flexibility and extensibility of K
compared to other verification systems: extensions can be incorpo-
rated without needing to make changes to the underlying prover.
The new K rule above gave the abstraction needed to succinctly
write the spec.
5.4 Dynamic byte arrays
This next program accepts a dynamically-sized, bytes-typed pa-
rameter named data and return its length:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract bytes00 {
3 function execute(bytes memory data)
4 public returns (uint) {
5
6 return data.length;
7 }
8 }
The specification follows the same pattern as the previous speci-
fications but uses the KEVM #buf construct to bind dynamically-
sized calldata:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(bytes)",
6 \#bytes (\#buf(DATA_LEN,DATA)))
7 where:
8 - \#range (0 <= DATA_LEN < 2 ^Int 16)
9 then:
10 match:
11 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
12 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(DATA_LEN))
The #buf(DATA_LEN,DATA) expression is a symbolic byte buffer
that introduces two fresh symbolic variables to bind the data pa-
rameter. DATA_LEN represents data’s length and DATA represents
its contents.
Note the where constraint in the specification which bounds
the length of DATA_LEN to be between 0 and 216. This constraint is
needed because the EVM imposes a 232 upper limit on the length
of a bytes array since it must fit into memory, which is 32-byte
addressable. However, this 232 upper bound is actually not tight
enough to make the specification pass because the EVM will need
to store other data in memory besides the bytes array. I could
not figure out a quick way to calculate the tightest possible upper
bound on DATA_LEN, so I did what was done for other K verifica-
tion projects such as the GnosisSafe [24], which was to arbitrarily
constrain DATA_LEN to 216.
Thus, technically-speaking, the correctness guarantees given
by the formal proof would not apply to transactions whose data
parameter is longer than 216 bytes. Practically speaking, it is unclear
whether it would be worth the effort to figure out the tightest
upper bound. This situation is an example of the common trade
off between the precision and cost of partial versus full formal
verification, as discussed in Section 3.4.2.
This is a good example of three usability challenges: automation
(Section 3.2), low-level specifications (Section 3.3.3), and prover
debugging (Section 3.6). The user needs to understand the EVM
at a low level to write a passing specification, and the actual tight
bound to make this specification pass is hard for a user to calculate.
Furthermore, the userâĂŹs first attempt at writing this specification
would likely be to erroneously constrain DATA_LEN to 232 and when
the prover fails to prove this, it is very non-obvious why and the
output of the K prover does not help because it only gives the set
of all intermediate proof states. It is possible that, if the prover
implementation was able to generate a counter-example, that is, a
concrete transaction that demonstrates the program violating the
specification, the user may have a better chance of figuring out the
reason for the specification failing.
5.5 Transaction Reverts
This next program uses Solidity’s require statement which reverts
the transaction when the a0 > 0 condition does not hold:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract requires00 {
3 function execute(uint256 a0)
4 public returns (uint256) {
5
6 require(a0 > 0);
7 return 5;
8 }
9 }
The specification now needs to cover more than one program
path: a success path when a0 > 0 and revert path when ¬a0 > 0.
Thus it has two spec blocks, one for each path:
1 - spec:
2 name: a0gt0
3 if:
4 match:
5 callData: #abiCallData2("execute(uint256)",
#uint256(A0))
6 where:
7 - A0 >Int 0
8 - #rangeUInt (256, A0)
9 then:
10 match:
11 output: #encodeArgs(#uint256 (5))
12 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
13
14 - spec:
15 name: a0le0
16 if:
17 match:
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18 callData: #abiCallData2("execute(uint256)",
#uint256(A0))
19 where:
20 - A0 <=Int 0
21 - #rangeUInt (256, A0)
22 then:
23 match:
24 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
The first spec named a0gt0 specifies the a0 > 0 case: the status
code of the execute function is EVMC_SUCCESS and the output is the
constant 5. The second spec named a0le0 specifies the ¬a0 > 0
case: the status code of the execute function is EVMC_REVERT and
the output is unspecified.
The specification can be slightly rewritten so that common parts
of the two spec blocks can be shared, instead of duplicated, in a
parent spec by using the inherits property:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: base
4 if:
5 match:
6 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(uint256)"
, \#uint256(A0))
7 where:
8 - \#rangeUInt (256, A0)
9
10 - rule:
11 name: a0gt0
12 inherits: base
13 if:
14 where:
15 - A0 >Int 0
16 then:
17 match:
18 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256 (5))
19 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
20
21 - rule:
22 name: a0le0
23 inherits: base
24 if:
25 where:
26 - A0 <=Int 0
27 then:
28 match:
29 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
The rewritten specification above introduces a third block named
base that lifts the common parts, and the a0gt0 and a0le0 blocks
now inherit the base block. While it may not seem that this
refactoring makes the specification more concise in this particular
example, when specifying larger programs, this feature will be
necessary to keep the specification readable as can be seen in final
SimpleMultiSigT3 specification in Section 6.3.
5.6 Hashing packed encoding
This next program calculates and returns the keccak-256 crypto-
graphic hash of a bytes array parameter prefixed with the single
byte of 0x1:
1 pragma solidity 0.4.24;
2 contract encodepacked_keccak01 {
3 function execute(bytes32 a0)
4 pure external returns(bytes32) {
5 return keccak256(
6 abi.encodePacked(byte(0x01),a0));
7 }
8 }
The specification uses the KEVM semantics function named
keccak256 that abstracts the keccak-256 cryptographic hash func-
tion as an uninterpreted function that assumes all the hashed values
appearing in each execution trace are collision-free:
1 - spec:
2 if:
3 match:
4 callData: #abiCallData2("execute(bytes32)",
5 #bytes32(A0))
6 where:
7 - #rangeUInt (256, A0)
8 then:
9 match:
10 output: #encodeArgs(#bytes32(keccak (1 :
11 #encodeArgs(#uint256(A0)))))
12 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
This abstraction of keccak-256 is the typical approach taken
by practical formal verification systems, where complex library
functions are abstracted by writing a formal specification for their
behavior called a formal summary, and then applying the formal
summary at call sites invoking the library function instead of di-
rectly verifying the library function’s code. This method of abstrac-
tion enables the user to decompose the verification task into two
steps: first formally verifying the program that uses the library
function, and then separately verifying the implementation of the
library function. See Section 5.8 for another example of how this
formal summary technique is used for programs that verify signa-
tures.
Now, when I tried to run the prover, I found that it failed to prove
the specification even though the specification is correct. It turned
out that the reason is that the actual EVM bytecode that this Solidity
program compiles down to has a loop that is essentially an inlined
"memcpy" for copying calldata to local memory. As discussed in
Section 3.2, in general, provers will not be able to reason about
loops with dynamic bounds automatically unless the user supplies
superfluous information such as a loop invariant.
The figure below illustrates this memcpy loop in the control
flow graph of the EVM bytecode of the encodepacked_keccak00
program.
I could have spent time writing a loop invariant but fortunately,
in this case, thereâĂŹs a simpler approach which was to update to
the 0.5.0 version of the Solidity compiler instead of 0.4.24 because
0.5.0 has optimizations that are able to optimize away the loop
entirely. The following program, which has been changed to use
pragma solidity 0.5.0, has an acyclic control flow graph and
the prover is able verify it.
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1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract encodepacked_keccak01 {
3 function execute(bytes32 a0)
4 pure external returns(bytes32) {
5 return keccak256(
6 abi.encodePacked(byte(0x01),a0));
7 }
8 }
This program is a good example of several usability challenges
that formal verification systems typically exhibit: automation, low-
level specifications, and prover debugging. It would be difficult
for a user to figure out that the compiled EVM bytecode has a
hidden loop that does not appear in the original Solidity source
program. If the prover was fully automated, this hidden loop would
not be an issue because the prover would just be able to prove the
specification without user intervention. But, because it cannot be
fully automated due to undecidability, the user needs to supply the
prover with a loop invariant in terms of the compiled EVM bytecode,
which means the user will have to decompile the bytecode, identify
the exact instruction counters of the loop entry/exit and make sense
of the difficult-to-follow stack-based push/pop/dup instructions of
the EVM.
5.7 Statically-sized loops
This next program has a loop that iterates three times after an initial
require check:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract staticloop00 {
3 function execute(uint a0)
4 pure external returns(uint256) {
5 uint sum = a0;
6 require (a0 < 10);
7 for (uint i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
8 sum += i;
9 }
10 return sum;
11 }
12 }
Note that statically-bound loops, such as this one, aremuch easier
for a prover to reason about automatically than a dynamically-
bound loop. In principle, a prover can automatically and fully
unroll a statically-sized loop into straight-line code. In contrast,
dynamically-bound loops require that the user supply a loop-invariant.
The specification below checks that, if the function parameter is
an integer within [0, 10), the transaction will return the value of
a0 + 3 with an EVMC_SUCCESS status code. Otherwise, it will revert
with a EVMC_REVERT status code:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(uint256)"
, \#uint256(A0))
6 where:
7 - \#range (0 <= A0 < 10)
8 then:
9 match:
10 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
11 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(A0 +Int 3))
5.8 Recovering an address from a signature
This next program accepts a 32-byte message and the (V,R,S) com-
ponents of an ECDSA signature. It uses the Solidity ecrecover
function to verify the signature on the message and recover the
signer address, and otherwise reverts:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract ecrecover00 {
3 function execute(bytes32 hash , uint8 sigV ,
4 bytes32 sigR , bytes32 sigS)
5 pure external returns(address) {
6 address a = ecrecover(hash , sigV , sigR , sigS)
;
7 require(a > address (0));
8 return a;
9 }
10 }
The specification below has three blocks: 1) the sigvalid block
specifies that the behavior of the program on a transaction with a
valid signature is to return the signer address, 2) the siginvalid
block specifies that it should revert if the signature is not valid, and
3) the base block is a parent of the other two blocks that keeps the
common components.
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: base
4 if:
5 match:
6 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(
bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)",
7 \#bytes32(HASH), \#uint8(SIGV),
8 \#bytes32(SIGR), \#bytes32(SIGS))
9 where:
10 - \#rangeUInt (256, HASH)
11 - \#rangeUInt (8, SIGV)
12 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGR)
13 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGS)
14 - ECREC_DATA ==K
15 \#encodeArgs (\ #bytes32(HASH), \#uint8(
SIGV),
16 \#bytes32(SIGR), \#bytes32(SIGS))
17
18 - rule:
19 name: sigvalid
20 inherits: base
21 if:
22 where:
23 - RECOVERED ==Int \#symEcrec(ECREC_DATA)
24 - not: \#ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA)
25 then:
26 match:
27 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
28 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #address(RECOVERED))
29
30 - rule:
31 name: siginvalid
32 inherits: base
33 if:
34 where:
35 - \#ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA)
36 then:
37 match:
38 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
39 output: _
The KEVM semantics defines two functions named #symEcrec
and #ecrecEmpty that abstract the ecrecover precompile as an un-
interpreted function, similar to how the keccak-256 cryptographic
hash function is abstracted (Section 5.6).
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5.9 Recovering a static array of signatures
This next program uses a static loop (Section 5.7) to iterate over
a static array (Section 5.3) of signatures (Section 5.8) and reverts
(Section 5.5) if any of them do not verify. Otherwise, the function
returns successfully. This program uses four different constructs
that were previously verified independently of each other in earlier
sections, but now they are combined into a single program. This
is a good example of how a user can incrementally build up the
specification of their program without needing to understand the
internals of how the prover works.
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract ecrecoverloop00 {
3 function execute(bytes32 hash ,
4 uint8 [2] memory sigV ,
5 bytes32 [2] memory sigR ,
6 bytes32 [2] memory sigS)
7 pure public {
8
9 for (uint i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
10 address a = ecrecover(hash , sigV[i],
11 sigR[i], sigS[i])
;
12 require(a > address (0));
13 }
14 }
15 }
The specification has four blocks. The base block serves as
the prefix of the three other blocks and specifies the behavior
related to function entry such calldata. The sigs-valid block
specifies the success case where all signatures can be verified.
The sigs0-invalid and sigs1-invalid blocks specify the cases
where the first and second signatures, respectively, cannot be veri-
fied:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: base
4 if:
5 match:
6 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(
bytes32,uint8[2],bytes32[2],bytes32[2]
)",
7 \#bytes32(HASH),
8 \#uint8(SIGV0), \#uint8(SIGV1),
9 \#bytes32(SIGR0), \#bytes32(
SIGR1),
10 \#bytes32(SIGS0), \#bytes32(
SIGS1))
11 where:
12 - \#rangeUInt (256, HASH)
13 - \#rangeUInt (8, SIGV0)
14 - \#rangeUInt (8, SIGV1)
15 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGR0)
16 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGR1)
17 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGS0)
18 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGS1)
19 - ECREC_DATA0 ==K
20 \#encodeArgs (\ #bytes32(HASH), \#uint8(
SIGV0),
21 \#bytes32(SIGR0), \#bytes32(SIGS0))
22 - ECREC_DATA1 ==K
23 \#encodeArgs (\ #bytes32(HASH), \#uint8(
SIGV1),
24 \#bytes32(SIGR1), \#bytes32(SIGS1))
25
26 - rule:
27 name: sigs-valid
28 inherits: base
29 if:
30 where:
31 - RECOVERED0 ==Int \#symEcrec(ECREC_DATA0)
32 - RECOVERED1 ==Int \#symEcrec(ECREC_DATA1)
33 - not: \#ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA0)
34 - not: \#ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA1)
35 then:
36 match:
37 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
38
39 - rule:
40 name: sig0-invalid
41 inherits: base
42 if:
43 where:
44 - \#ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA0)
45 then:
46 match:
47 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
48
49 - rule:
50 name: sig1-invalid
51 inherits: base
52 if:
53 where:
54 - \#ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA1)
55 then:
56 match:
57 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
The prover was able to prove the specification above. But, then,
I made a slight modification to the ecrecoverloop00 program by
only adding a new bytes-typed parameter named data, which is
not used at all in the body of the Solidity function:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract ecrecoverloop01 {
3 function execute(bytes32 hash , bytes memory data ,
4 uint8 [2] memory sigV ,
5 bytes32 [2] memory sigR ,
6 bytes32 [2] memory sigS)
7 pure public {
8
9 for (uint i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
10 address a = ecrecover(hash , sigV[i],
11 sigR[i], sigS[i])
;
12 require(a > address (0));
13 }
14 }
15 }
To clarify, the reason I added this dead parameter is that my goal
is to eventually reconstruct the SimpleMultiSig program which
accepts such a bytes parameter in the same function that verifies
signatures using a loop.
Unintuitively, simply adding this dead data parameter causes the
prover to timeout on the sig1-invalid specification, when using
a time limit of 30 minutes. In contrast, without this parameter, the
prover returns successfully within three minutes. It turned out that,
in order to fix this issue, I needed to add the additional, superfluous
where constraint not: #ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA0) on line 6 to
the sig1-invalid specification:
1 - spec:
2 name: sig1-invalid
3 inherits: base
4 if:
5 where:
6 - not: #ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA0 )
7 - #ecrecEmpty(ECREC_DATA1)
8 then:
9 match:
10 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
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This additional constraint is superfluous in the logical sense
because it does not change the specificationâĂŹs logical meaning
since A∨B is equivalent to A∨ (¬A∧B). Conceptually, adding this
additional conjunct helps the prover succeed because it directly
captures the behavior of the for-loop. There may exist multiple
invalid signatures, but the for-loop terminates when it reaches the
very first invalid signature, so the specification needed to faithfully
capture this behavior.
5.10 Reading from storage
This next program reads the storage variable n and returns its value:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract storage00 {
3 uint private n;
4
5 function execute () view public returns(uint) {
6 return n;
7 }
8 }
The corresponding specification below shows how the KEVM
semantics abstracts storage as an integer map represented by fresh
symbolic variable S and uses the KEVM select function to calculate
the offset per Solidity’s interpretation of the EVM storage:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 storage: S
6 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute ()", .
TypedArgs)
7 where:
8 - N ==Int select(S, \#hashedLocation("
Solidity",
9 0, .IntList))
10 - \#rangeUInt (256, N)
11 then:
12 match:
13 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(N))
14 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
5.11 Writing to storage
This next program writes the constant 5 to the storage variable n,
reads n and then returns its value:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract storage01 {
3 uint private n;
4
5 function execute () public returns(uint) {
6 n = 5;
7 return n;
8 }
9 }
The EVM will give a refund of ether to the caller if a transaction
writes the value of 0 to a storage location, which enables the EVM to
stop explicitly tracking that storage location on-chain. The rationale
of this refund mechanism is to incentivize users to free up storage
they are not using anymore. For this specific program, however,
there is never a refund because storage is always written with the
value 5, not 0. Thus, the specification below has the refund cell
set to 0 indicating a caller will never receive a refund under any
transaction.
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 if:
4 match:
5 storage: S0
6 refund: 0
7 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute ()", .
TypedArgs)
8 where:
9 - N0 ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("
Solidity",
10 0, .IntList))
11 - \#rangeUInt (256, N0)
12 then:
13 match:
14 storage: S1
15 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(N1))
16 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
17 where:
18 - N1 ==Int select(S1, \#hashedLocation("
Solidity",
19 0, .IntList))
20 - N1 ==Int 5
The prover should have been able prove the specification above,
however, it was not able to do. Interestingly, the prover constructed
a symbolic expression that had a value of zero, but it was unable
to simplify this expression to zero on its own. To fix this, I needed
to add a new lemma that helped the prover understand that the
expression does in fact simplify to zero:
1 rule Rsstore(BYZANTIUM, NEW, CURR, ORIG) => 0
requires NEW =/=Int 0
5.12 Writing overflow to storage
This next program increments the storage variable n which will
overflow when n is 2256 − 1:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract storage02 {
3 uint private n;
4
5 function execute () public returns(uint) {
6 n = n + 1;
7 return n;
8 }
9 }
The specification needs to handle the non-overflow and overflow
cases separately because the +Int operator used by the KEVM
semantics is integer addition, rather than modular addition:
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: base
4 if:
5 match:
6 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute ()", .
TypedArgs)
7 storage: S0
8 refund: _
9 where:
10 - N0 ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("
Solidity", 0, .IntList))
11 then:
12 match:
13 storage: S1
14 refund: _
15 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
16 output: \#encodeArgs (\ #uint256(N1))
17
18 - rule:
19 name: no-overflow
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20 inherits: base
21 if:
22 where:
23 - \#range (0 <= N0 < 2 ^Int 256 -Int 1)
24 - N1 ==Int N0 +Int 1
25
26 - rule:
27 name: overflow
28 inherits: base
29 if:
30 where:
31 - N0 ==Int 2 ^Int 256 -Int 1
32 - N1 ==Int 0
The prover was able to prove the no-overflow specification
automatically without any user intervention, but not the overflow
specification. The reason was that output cell of the final proof
state had the term
#buf(32, chop(select(S0, 0) + 1))
which represents a 32-byte buffer whose value is one plus the zeroth
storage slot under modular addition. The final proof state also had
the constraint
select(S0,0) = 2256
which constrains the zeroth storage slot to 2256. Ideally, the prover
should have been able to simplify chop(select(S0, 0) + 1) to
the value 0 on its own, but I needed to add the following lemma
which simply states that applying the chop function to 2256 should
simplify to 0:
1 rule chop(I) => 0 requires I ==Int pow256
5.13 Calling an address
This next program invokes the destination parameter with a call
payload passed by the caller:
1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2 contract call00 {
3 function execute(bool condition , uint gasLimit ,
4 uint value , bytes memory data ,
5 address destination) public {
6 require(condition);
7 bool success = false;
8 assembly {
9 success := call(gasLimit , destination ,
10 value , add(data , 0x20),
11 mload(data), 0, 0)
12 }
13 require(success);
14 }
15 }
The specification checks the following correctness properties:
• Call to destination is invoked at least once if condition
is true
• Call to destination is not invoked if condition is false
• Call to destination is invoked at most once if condition
is true
• Call to destination is invoked with the correct value, gas
limit, return start/length
• Call to destination is invokedwith correct data start/length
• execute reverts if call to destination returns an error code
execute succeeds if call to destination returns a success
code
• No storage reads or writes after the call to destination.
1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: base
4 if:
5 match:
6 callData: \#abiCallData("execute",
7 \#bool(CONDITION),
8 \#uint256(GAS_LIMIT), \#uint256(VALUE
),
9 \#bytes (\#buf(DATA_LEN,DATA)),
10 \#address(DESTINATION))
11 callLog: .List
12 where:
13 - \#rangeAddress(DESTINATION)
14 - \#rangeUInt (8, CONDITION)
15 - \#rangeUInt (256, GAS_LIMIT)
16 - \#rangeUInt (256, VALUE)
17 - \#rangeUInt (256, DATA_LEN)
18 - DATA_LEN <Int 2 ^Int 16
19 - CALL_PC ==Int 364
20 - CONDITION ==Int 1
21 then:
22 match:
23 callLog: ListItem ( 0 CALL_PC GAS_LIMIT
24 DESTINATION VALUE ARGSTART_C
25 ARGWIDTH_C 0 0 LM_C .List .List
)
26 .List
27 where:
28 - selectRange(LM_C, ARGSTART_C, ARGWIDTH_C)
==K
29 \#buf(DATA_LEN,DATA)
30
31 - rule:
32 name: call-succeeded
33 inherits: base
34 if:
35 where:
36 - \#callSuccess (0, DESTINATION)
37 then:
38 match:
39 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
40
41 - rule:
42 name: call-failed
43 inherits: base
44 if:
45 where:
46 - \#callFailure (0, DESTINATION)
47 then:
48 match:
49 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
To check these properties, I needed to extend the KEVM se-
mantics by adding a new cell in the KEVM configuration named
callLog to keep track of a list of all the call invocations during
transaction execution. Each element in the list is a tuple represent-
ing callsite information including the call index, program counter,
gas limit, memory offset and size of the parameters and return value.
I also added two new cells named readLog and writeLog that keep
track of all the storage reads and writes to check that none occur
after call instructions. The details are omitted here due to space
limitations.
6 SIMPLEMULTISIG
Multisig wallets are compelling targets for formal verification be-
cause they control high-value assets. The SimpleMultiSig smart
contract [16, 17] is a minimal multisig wallet written in Solidity for
the EVM. Its code is included in the appendix under Listing 1.
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6.1 Correctness Properties
This section aims to give a complete, but informal, list of high-
level correctness properties that a SimpleMultiSig implementa-
tion should have.
• If the transaction does not include a call payload, then the
transaction is rejected and has no effect on the Ethereum
state.
• The threshold and set of owners can never be changed once
the program is deployed to an account.
• The program is not susceptible to replay attacks. Once a
transactionâĂŹs call payload is executed successfully on-
chain, the transaction, or a part thereof, can never be used
to have any further effect on the Ethereum state.
• If the transaction does not have at least a threshold number
of owner signatures that each sign the transactionâĂŹs call
payload, the transaction has no effect on the Ethereum state.
• If the transaction does have at least a threshold number of
owner signatures that each sign the transactionâĂŹs call
payload, and the call payload is invoked exactly once in-
traprocedurally.
• If the transactionâĂŹs call payload is invoked but does not
execute successfully, the transaction has no effect on the
Ethereum state.
• The program is effectively callback free [9] and thus has no
re-entrancy vulnerabilities.
• Ether is never locked in the program.
• The program has no other functionality.
6.2 Modifications
I made two changes to the SimpleMultiSig implementation to make
it easier to formally verify using KEVM and called this new version
SimpleMultiSigT3 as shown in Listing 2 in the appendix.
6.2.1 Modification #1: Statically-sized Arrays. The SimpleMultiSig
uses dynamically-sized array parameters in the execute function
to pass the (V ,R, S) components of the signatures. In principle,
KEVM can be used to reason about dynamic arrays, however, to
automate this reasoning, KEVM would need to be extended with
additional lemmas, which are difficult for a non-expert to write
correctly. Thus, I modified the code by replacing these dynamically-
sized array parameters with statically-sized arrays instead, which
means that the program would only work for a specific threshold.
For example, Listing 2 in the appendix shows the program would
change when the threshold is statically set to 3.
Fortunately, this modification does not restrict the functionality
of the SimpleMultiSig because the threshold is immutable anyway
once the constructor initializes the contract account. However, it
does mean that users would need to code-generate the program for
the specific threshold that they needed. Incidentally, using statically-
sized arrays also has the advantage of reducing gas costs by:
• reducing transaction size since the ABI encoding of the static
arrays is shorter,
• reducing overhead of copying the array calldata into mem-
ory,
• eliminating the two require checks on the lengths of the sig-
nature parameters since the lengths are statically-enforced,
• eliminating memory reads on the signature array-length
checks in signature validation loop, and
• reducing the size of the bytecode
To simplify the presentation in this paper, I use the specific code-
generation of the SimpleMultiSig, named to SimpleMultiSigT3,
where the threshold is statically fixed to three, but the discus-
sion and the specification can be straightforwardly adapted to any
threshold.
6.2.2 Modification #2: Solidity version. I also replaced the directive
pragma solidity ^0.4.24 with pragma solidity 0.5.0 to
restrict the scope of the verification to EVM bytecode generated
by a Solidity 0.5.0 compiler. The Solidity 0.4.24 compiler is missing
some code optimizations that the 0.5.0 version introduces. These
optimizations generate significantly simpler bytecode which was
easier for KEVM to reason about automatically as discussed in
Section 5.6.
6.3 Partial Formal Specification of
SimpleMultiSigT3
The partial formal specification written for SimpleMultiSigT3 is
given in Listing 3 in the Appendix. The specification consists of
seven individual K rules informally described below.
• The executor-invalid rule checks that the execute func-
tion reverts if the executor argument is not 0 and is not
equal to the msg.sender of the transaction.
• The sigcheck-fail-revert-0 rule checks that the execute
function reverts if the first signature is not valid for the
EIP712 encoding of the multisig payload, which includes the
gasLimit, destination, executor, value, and data argu-
ments, and the nonce storage variable.
• The sigcheck-fail-revert-1 rule is the same as the pre-
vious rule but for the second signature.
• The sigcheck-fail-revert-2 rule is the same as the pre-
vious rule but for the third signature.
• The ownercheck-fail-revert rule checks that the execute
function reverts if any of the three addresses recovered from
the signatures are not owners. And, the function reverts if
the three addresses are not in a strictly increasing order. In
other words, the first address must be numerically less than
the second address, and the second address must be numeri-
cally less than the third address. This requirement ensures
the addresses are unique.
• The call-failure rule checks that the execute function
reverts if the call to the destination argument returns 0,
which indicates the call reverted, for example, due to running
out of gas or other reasons.
• The call-success rule checks that the execute function
succeeds if 1) the executor argument is either 0 or is equal
to msg.sender, 2) the three signatures are all valid and each
recover to unique owners of the wallet, 3) the call invokes
the destination exactly once and with the correct multisig
payload, 4) the call returns 1, which indicates that it suc-
ceeded, and 5) no storage variables are modified after the
call.
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Note that these rules do not comprehensively cover all the cor-
rectness properties listed in Section 6.1. For example, they do not
check the following aspects of the SimpleMultiSig, among others,
which we leave for future work:
• storage initialization by constructor
• ether balance updates
• re-entrancy
• bounds on gas usage
• dynamic array calldata
Furthermore, a full formal verification would also require infor-
mally, yet rigorously, arguing that the formal specification faithfully
captures the correctness properties in Section 6.1.
The table below gives the results of running the seven K rules
through the prover over the SimpleMultiSigT3 program using a
c5.2xlarge AWS EC2 instance, which has 16GB of RAM and a 3.4
GHz Intel Xeon Platinum 8000 processor.
Rule Time (min) Result
executor-invalid 2.2 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-0 7.1 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-1 11.2 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-2 18.9 proved true
ownercheck-fail-revert 44.2 proved true
call-failure 45.9 proved true
call-success 48.6 proved true
Table 1: Results of running the seven K rules through the
prover over SimpleMultiSigT3.
7 TESTING SPECIFICATIONS
The output of the prover is a simple "yes" or "no": was it, or was
it not, able to prove the specification? This meant that I had to
trust that the prover itself did not have bugs, but, as is usually the
case with formal verification provers, their implementations are
large, extremely complex, and depend on sophisticatedmathematics
and algorithms which could easily have been coded incorrectly
(Section 3.5). Because the stakes of a bug in the SimpleMultiSig is
so high, I had to find a way to at least spot check the prover’s work.
Similarly, I also had to trust that the formal specification I wrote
itself did not have any bugs, which is very possible considering
how long it is and how unusual specification languages are to a
programmer.
To try to mitigate both of these trust issues, I created thirty-
two faulty variations of the SimpleMultiSigT3 program. In the
software testing literature, these faulty variations are called mu-
tants [13] and are constructed by taking the original program and
changing it slightly to add a bug. Traditionally, mutants have been
used to evaluate the effectiveness of manual test suites, but here
I use the same idea to spot check the specification and prover. I
ran the prover with the formal specification in Section 6.3 over
each of the mutants and then checked to make sure that the prover
failed to prove the specification on each mutant. The remainder
of this section discusses a few examples of the different types of
mutants used, and the full list of the test results can be found at
https://www.kspec.io/simplemultisig/tests.html.
7.1 Example Test Case: Call Mutation
The call_7.solmutant adds a bug to SimpleMultiSigT3 by adding
a second call to the destination:
Table 2 below gives the results of running the prover on this
mutant. This test case successfully passes because at least one of the
K rules fail, specifically, the call-failure and the call-success
rules.
Rule Time (min) Result
executor-invalid 2.0 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-0 6.6 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-1 11.3 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-2 19.2 proved true
ownercheck-fail-revert 42.5 proved true
call-failure 51.6 error
call-success 53.0 error
Table 2: Results of running the seven K rules through the
prover over amutant which invokes the destination address
more than once.
7.2 Example Test Case: EIP712 Encoding
Mutation
The eip712_0.sol mutant adds a bug to the EIP712 encoding
of the multisig payload by changing the first argument of the
abi.encoding function invocation to 0 instead of TXHASH_TYPE
Table 3 below gives the results of running the K prover on this
mutant. All except one of the specifications time out, which means
that the prover process failed to exit within the three-hour time limit.
I chose three hours because, for the correct SimpleMultiSigT3.sol
program, the prover exits in under an hour for each of the spec-
ifications. I make the assumption that if the prover takes at least
three times longer than it would on the correct program, then it
will not be able to prove the specification on the incorrect program
even if it was run for longer than three hours.
Rule Time (min) Result
executor-invalid 2.2 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-0 180 timeout
sigcheck-fail-revert-1 180 timeout
sigcheck-fail-revert-2 180 timeout
ownercheck-fail-revert 180 timeout
call-failure 180 timeout
call-success 180 timeout
Table 3: Results of running the seven K rules through the
prover on a mutant which incorrectly passes the value 0 to
the EIP712 encoding rather than TXHASH_TYPE.
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7.3 Example Test Case: Signature Checking
Mutation
The sigcheck_5.solmutant adds a bug to SimpleMultiSigT3 by
removing the requires check which ensures the signatures are
unique by enforcing that they are passed to the function in order
of the strictly increasing value of their recovered addresses:
Table 4 below gives the results of running the prover on this mu-
tant. This test case successfully passes because at least one of the K
rules fail, specifically, all of them except for the executor-invalid
spec.
Rule Time (min) Result
executor-invalid 2.1 proved true
sigcheck-fail-revert-0 180.0 timeout
sigcheck-fail-revert-1 30.9 error
sigcheck-fail-revert-2 24.1 error
ownercheck-fail-revert 49.6 error
call-failure 46.9 error
call-success 50.0 error
Table 4: Results of running the seven K rules through the
prover over a mutant which removes the uniqueness check
on the signatures.
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1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2
3 contract SimpleMultiSig {
4
5 // EIP712 Precomputed hashes:
6 // keccak256 (" EIP712Domain(string name ,string version ,uint256 chainId ,address verifyingContract ,bytes32 salt)")
7 bytes32 constant EIP712DOMAINTYPE_HASH = 0xd87cd6ef79d4e2b95e15ce8abf732db51ec771f1ca2edccf22a46c729ac56472;
8
9 // keccak256 (" Simple MultiSig ")
10 bytes32 constant NAME_HASH = 0xb7a0bfa1b79f2443f4d73ebb9259cddbcd510b18be6fc4da7d1aa7b1786e73e6;
11
12 // keccak256 ("1")
13 bytes32 constant VERSION_HASH = 0xc89efdaa54c0f20c7adf612882df0950f5a951637e0307cdcb4c672f298b8bc6;
14
15 // keccak256 (" MultiSigTransaction(address destination ,uint256 value ,bytes data ,uint256 nonce ,address executor ,
uint256 gasLimit)")
16 bytes32 constant TXTYPE_HASH = 0x3ee892349ae4bbe61dce18f95115b5dc02daf49204cc602458cd4c1f540d56d7;
17
18 bytes32 constant SALT = 0x251543af6a222378665a76fe38dbceae4871a070b7fdaf5c6c30cf758dc33cc0;
19
20 uint public nonce; // (only) mutable state
21 uint public threshold; // immutable state
22 mapping (address => bool) isOwner; // immutable state
23 address [] public ownersArr; // immutable state
24
25 bytes32 DOMAIN_SEPARATOR; // hash for EIP712 , computed from contract address
26
27 // Note that owners_ must be strictly increasing , in order to prevent duplicates
28 constructor(uint threshold_ , address [] owners_ , uint chainId) public {
29 require(owners_.length <= 10 && threshold_ <= owners_.length && threshold_ > 0);
30
31 address lastAdd = address (0);
32 for (uint i = 0; i < owners_.length; i++) {
33 require(owners_[i] > lastAdd);
34 isOwner[owners_[i]] = true;
35 lastAdd = owners_[i];
36 }
37 ownersArr = owners_;
38 threshold = threshold_;
39
40 DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = keccak256(abi.encode(EIP712DOMAINTYPE_HASH ,NAME_HASH ,VERSION_HASH ,chainId ,this ,SALT));
41 }
42
43 // Note that address recovered from signatures must be strictly increasing , in order to prevent duplicates
44 function execute(uint8 [] sigV , bytes32 [] sigR , bytes32 [] sigS , address destination , uint value , bytes data ,
address executor , uint gasLimit) public {
45 require(sigR.length == threshold);
46 require(sigR.length == sigS.length && sigR.length == sigV.length);
47 require(executor == msg.sender || executor == address (0));
48
49 // EIP712 scheme: https :// github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip -712.md
50 bytes32 txInputHash = keccak256(abi.encode(TXTYPE_HASH , destination , value , keccak256(data), nonce , executor ,
gasLimit));
51 bytes32 totalHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19\x01", DOMAIN_SEPARATOR , txInputHash));
52
53 address lastAdd = address (0); // cannot have address (0) as an owner
54 for (uint i = 0; i < threshold; i++) {
55 address recovered = ecrecover(totalHash , sigV[i], sigR[i], sigS[i]);
56 require(recovered > lastAdd && isOwner[recovered ]);
57 lastAdd = recovered;
58 }
59
60 // If we make it here all signatures are accounted for.
61 nonce = nonce + 1;
62 bool success = false;
63 assembly { success := call(gasLimit , destination , value , add(data , 0x20), mload(data), 0, 0) }
64 require(success);
65 }
66
67 function () payable external {}
68 }
Listing 1: Original implementation of the SimpleMultiSig smart contract [16]
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1 pragma solidity 0.5.0;
2
3 contract SimpleMultiSigT3 {
4
5 // EIP712 Precomputed hashes:
6 // keccak256 (" EIP712Domain(string name ,string version ,uint256 chainId ,address verifyingContract ,bytes32 salt)")
7 bytes32 constant EIP712DOMAINTYPE_HASH = 0xd87cd6ef79d4e2b95e15ce8abf732db51ec771f1ca2edccf22a46c729ac56472;
8
9 // keccak256 (" Simple MultiSig ")
10 bytes32 constant NAME_HASH = 0xb7a0bfa1b79f2443f4d73ebb9259cddbcd510b18be6fc4da7d1aa7b1786e73e6;
11
12 // keccak256 ("1")
13 bytes32 constant VERSION_HASH = 0xc89efdaa54c0f20c7adf612882df0950f5a951637e0307cdcb4c672f298b8bc6;
14
15 // keccak256 (" MultiSigTransaction(address destination ,uint256 value ,bytes data ,uint256 nonce ,address executor ,
uint256 gasLimit)")
16 bytes32 constant TXTYPE_HASH = 0x3ee892349ae4bbe61dce18f95115b5dc02daf49204cc602458cd4c1f540d56d7;
17
18 bytes32 constant SALT = 0x251543af6a222378665a76fe38dbceae4871a070b7fdaf5c6c30cf758dc33cc0;
19
20 uint constant THRESHOLD = 3; // immutable state
21
22 uint public nonce; // (only) mutable state
23 mapping (address => bool) isOwner; // immutable state
24 address [] public ownersArr; // immutable state
25 bytes32 DOMAIN_SEPARATOR; // hash for EIP712 , computed from contract address
26
27 // Note that owners_ must be strictly increasing , in order to prevent duplicates
28 constructor(address [] memory owners_ , uint chainId) public {
29 require(owners_.length <= 10 && THRESHOLD <= owners_.length);
30
31 address lastAdd = address (0);
32 for (uint i = 0; i < owners_.length; i++) {
33 require(owners_[i] > lastAdd);
34 isOwner[owners_[i]] = true;
35 lastAdd = owners_[i];
36 }
37 ownersArr = owners_;
38
39 DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = keccak256(abi.encode(EIP712DOMAINTYPE_HASH ,NAME_HASH ,VERSION_HASH ,chainId ,this ,SALT));
40 }
41
42 // Note that address recovered from signatures must be strictly increasing , in order to prevent duplicates
43 function execute(uint8 [3] memory sigV , bytes32 [3] memory sigR , bytes32 [3] memory sigS , address destination , uint
value , bytes memory data , address executor , uint gasLimit) public {
44 require(executor == msg.sender || executor == address (0));
45
46 // EIP712 scheme: https :// github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip -712.md
47 bytes32 txInputHash = keccak256(abi.encode(TXTYPE_HASH , destination , value , keccak256(data), nonce , executor
, gasLimit));
48 bytes32 totalHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19\x01", DOMAIN_SEPARATOR , txInputHash));
49
50 address lastAdd = address (0); // cannot have address (0) as an owner
51 for (uint i = 0; i < THRESHOLD; i++) {
52 address recovered = ecrecover(totalHash , sigV[i], sigR[i], sigS[i]);
53 require(recovered > lastAdd && isOwner[recovered ]);
54 lastAdd = recovered;
55 }
56
57 // If we make it here all signatures are accounted for.
58 nonce = nonce + 1;
59 bool success = false;
60 assembly { success := call(gasLimit , destination , value , add(data , 0x20), mload(data), 0, 0) }
61 require(success);
62 }
63
64 function () payable external {}
65 }
Listing 2: SimpleMultiSigT3
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1 spec:
2 - rule:
3 name: base
4 if:
5 match:
6 storage: S0
7 callData: \#abiCallData2("execute(uint8[3],bytes32[3],bytes32[3],address,uint256,bytes,address,uint256)",
8 \#uint8(SIGV0), \#uint8(SIGV1), \#uint8(SIGV2),
9 \#bytes32(SIGR0), \#bytes32(SIGR1), \#bytes32(SIGR2),
10 \#bytes32(SIGS0), \#bytes32(SIGS1), \#bytes32(SIGS2),
11 \#address(DESTINATION),
12 \#uint256(VALUE),
13 \#bytes (\#buf(DATA_LEN,DATA)),
14 \#address(EXECUTOR),
15 \#uint256(GAS_LIMIT))
16 call_log_pcset: SetItem(CALL_PC) .Set
17 where:
18 - CALL_PC ==Int 1786
19 - TXTYPE_HASH ==K "0x3ee892349ae4bbe61dce18f95115b5dc02daf49204cc602458cd4c1f540d56d7"
20 - NONCE_SLOT ==Int 0
21 - NONCE_0 ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("Solidity", NONCE_SLOT, .IntList))
22 - \#rangeUInt (256, NONCE_0)
23 - NONCE_0 <Int 2 ^Int 256 -Int 1
24 - OWNER_MAPPING_SLOT ==Int 1
25 - DOMAIN_SEPARATOR ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("Solidity", 3, .IntList))
26 - \#rangeAddress(DESTINATION)
27 - \#rangeUInt (256, VALUE)
28 - \#rangeUInt (256, DATA_LEN)
29 - DATA_LEN <Int 2 ^Int 16
30 - \#rangeAddress(EXECUTOR)
31 - \#rangeUInt (256, GAS_LIMIT)
32 - \#rangeBytes (32, DOMAIN_SEPARATOR)
33 - \#rangeUInt (8, SIGV0)
34 - \#rangeUInt (8, SIGV1)
35 - \#rangeUInt (8, SIGV2)
36 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGR0)
37 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGR1)
38 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGR2)
39 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGS0)
40 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGS1)
41 - \#rangeBytes (32, SIGS2)
42
43 - rule:
44 name: executor-invalid
45 inherits: base
46 if:
47 where:
48 - EXECUTOR =/=Int MSG_SENDER
49 - EXECUTOR =/=Int 0
50 then:
51 match:
52 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
53
54 - rule:
55 name: executor-valid
56 inherits: base
57 if:
58 where:
59 - or:
60 - EXECUTOR ==Int MSG_SENDER
61 - EXECUTOR ==Int 0
62 - TX_INPUT_HASH ==Int keccak (\ #encodeArgs(
63 \#bytes32 (\ #parseHexWord(TXTYPE_HASH)),
64 \#address(DESTINATION),
65 \#uint256(VALUE),
66 \#bytes32(keccak (\#buf(DATA_LEN,DATA))),
67 \#uint256(NONCE_0),
68 \#address(EXECUTOR),
69 \#uint256(GAS_LIMIT)))
70 - >
71 TX_TOTAL_HASH ==Int keccak (25: 1: #encodeArgs(#bytes32(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR),#bytes32(TX_INPUT_HASH)))
72 - ECREC_DATA0 ==K \#encodeArgs( \#bytes32(TX_TOTAL_HASH), \#uint8(SIGV0), \#bytes32(SIGR0), \#bytes32(
SIGS0))
73 - ECREC_DATA1 ==K \#encodeArgs( \#bytes32(TX_TOTAL_HASH), \#uint8(SIGV1), \#bytes32(SIGR1), \#bytes32(
SIGS1))
74 - ECREC_DATA2 ==K \#encodeArgs( \#bytes32(TX_TOTAL_HASH), \#uint8(SIGV2), \#bytes32(SIGR2), \#bytes32(
SIGS2))
Listing 3: Partial formal specification of SimpleMultiSigT3
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76 - rule:
77 name: sigcheck-fail-revert-0
78 inherits: executor-valid
79 if:
80 where:
81 - \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA0 )
82 then:
83 match:
84 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
85
86 - rule:
87 name: valid-sigcheck-fail-revert-1
88 inherits: executor-valid
89 if:
90 where:
91 - not: \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA0 )
92 - \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA1 )
93 then:
94 match:
95 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
96
97 - rule:
98 name: valid-sigcheck-fail-revert-2
99 inherits: executor-valid
100 if:
101 where:
102 - not: \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA0 )
103 - not: \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA1 )
104 - \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA2 )
105 then:
106 match:
107 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
108
109 - rule:
110 name: sigcheck-pass
111 inherits: executor-valid
112 if:
113 where:
114 - RECOVERED0 ==Int \#symEcrec( ECREC_DATA0 )
115 - RECOVERED1 ==Int \#symEcrec( ECREC_DATA1 )
116 - RECOVERED2 ==Int \#symEcrec( ECREC_DATA2 )
117 - not: \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA0 )
118 - not: \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA1 )
119 - not: \#ecrecEmpty( ECREC_DATA2 )
120 - \#rangeAddress(RECOVERED0)
121 - \#rangeAddress(RECOVERED1)
122 - \#rangeAddress(RECOVERED2)
123 - IS_OWNER0 ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("Solidity", OWNER_MAPPING_SLOT, RECOVERED0))
124 - IS_OWNER1 ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("Solidity", OWNER_MAPPING_SLOT, RECOVERED1))
125 - IS_OWNER2 ==Int select(S0, \#hashedLocation("Solidity", OWNER_MAPPING_SLOT, RECOVERED2))
126 - \#rangeUInt (8, IS_OWNER0)
127 - \#rangeUInt (8, IS_OWNER1)
128 - \#rangeUInt (8, IS_OWNER2)
129
130 - rule:
131 name: ownercheck-fail-revert
132 inherits: sigcheck-pass
133 if:
134 where:
135 - or:
136 - IS_OWNER0 ==Int 0
137 - IS_OWNER1 ==Int 0
138 - IS_OWNER2 ==Int 0
139 - RECOVERED0 >=Int RECOVERED1
140 - RECOVERED1 >=Int RECOVERED2
141 then:
142 match:
143 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
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145 - rule:
146 name: ownercheck-pass-call
147 inherits: sigcheck-pass
148 if:
149 match:
150 storage: S0
151 readLog: .List
152 writeLog: .List
153 callLog: .List
154 where:
155 - IS_OWNER0 =/=Int 0
156 - IS_OWNER1 =/=Int 0
157 - IS_OWNER2 =/=Int 0
158 - RECOVERED0 <Int RECOVERED1
159 - RECOVERED1 <Int RECOVERED2
160 then:
161 match:
162 storage: S1
163 readLog: RD_FULL
164 writeLog: WR_FULL
165 callLog: ListItem ( 0 CALL_PC GAS_LIMIT DESTINATION VALUE ARGSTART_C ARGWIDTH_C 0 0 LM_C RD_C WR_C) .List
166 where:
167 - selectRange(LM_C, ARGSTART_C, ARGWIDTH_C) ==K \#buf(DATA_LEN,DATA)
168 - S0 ==IMap S1 except (SetItem (\ #hashedLocation("Solidity", NONCE_SLOT, .IntList)) .Set)
169 - NONCE_1 ==Int select(S1, \#hashedLocation("Solidity", NONCE_SLOT, .IntList))
170 - NONCE_1 >Int NONCE_0
171 - RD_FULL ==K RD_C
172 - WR_FULL ==K WR_C
173
174 - rule:
175 name: call-success
176 inherits: ownercheck-pass-call
177 if:
178 where:
179 - \#callSuccess (0, DESTINATION)
180 then:
181 match:
182 statusCode: EVMC_SUCCESS
183
184 - rule:
185 name: call-failure
186 inherits: ownercheck-pass-call
187 if:
188 where:
189 - \#callFailure (0, DESTINATION)
190 then:
191 match:
192 statusCode: EVMC_REVERT
Listing 5: Partial formal specification of SimpleMultiSigT3
